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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal organizations come in a variety of forms, from loose
confederations of street thugs with fluid membership and territorial
claims, to hierarchical entities employing elaborate initiation rites
and regular procedures that operate like legitimate businesses.
Assessing the criminality of the individual member of the criminal
group becomes more problematic as the entity takes on greater
complexity. Whereas most members of a street gang participate in
a number of illegal acts, a tightly organized criminal enterprise
shields its leadership from direct participation in the illegal acts.
Prosecutors face the challenge of proving that the leaders of the
organization are as liable as their lower-ranking confederates. With
criminal organizations undertaking more sophisticated activity that
often involves international movement of goods and proceeds, the
criminal law of the United States has extended the power of
prosecutors to reach not just the leadership of criminal
organizations, but also their assistants operating in legitimate
enterprises and to seize the profits from illegal transactions.
This Report is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the basic
criminal liability rules for holding one person liable for the conduct
of another and constitutional problems with imposing criminal
liability based solely on one's membership in an organization, even
one devoted to criminal goals, absent evidence that the member
actively sought to promote illegal activity. Part II considers the
broad application of the law of conspiracy in the United States,
including the related topics of substantive liability for the conduct
of a co-conspirator and the expansive avenues available to prove the
existence of a conspiracy. Part 1I discusses special criminal statutes
that target criminal organizations by expanding liability to include
ostensibly legal conduct that can be used to attribute criminal
liability to the members and their adjuncts operating in otherwise
legitimate businesses. Part IV reviews the enhanced penalties
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available to punish those who participate in criminal organizations
and special procedures to deprive the organizations of the fruits of
their illegal activity through broad asset forfeiture provisions.
II. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF OTHERS
The common law distinguished a participant's role in an offense
by dividing the parties to a felony into four categories: (1) principal
in the first degree; (2) principal in the second degree; (3) accessory
before the fact; and (4) accessory after the fact.1 The federal
government and virtually all of the states have abandoned the
common law distinction between parties to a crime and impose
liability on all participants equally.' While the accomplice's liability
derives from the primary actor's liability, there is no distinction
between the two for purposes of punishment?
The broad principle of accomplice liability holds a person liable
for the acts of another if the person "(a) gave assistance or
encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent [the
crime] (b) with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate
commission of the crime."4 One commentator points out that "the
premise that a person may be held criminally responsible for the
conduct of another should prove surprising, if not also disturbing." 5
1. SeeJOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW S 30.03 (2d ed.
1995).
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994) ("Whoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal."); DRESSLER, supra note 1, S 30.03 [A]
[1] ("Today, however, virtually every state has repealed most or all of the
common law distinctions."). The common law categories remain important in
some jurisdictions that limit conviction of those who did not commit the crime
if the person who did commit it cannot be prosecuted or is found not guilty. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW S 6.6 (2d ed.
1986).
3. See Grace E. Mueller, The Mens Rea ofAccomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2169, 2172 (1988) (stating that "all jurisdictions punish an accomplice the
same as the perpetrator of the substantive offense").
4. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 2, § 6.7.
5. DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 30.02[B].
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Yet, the liability of one person for the acts of another goes
unquestioned, and it is firmly entrenched in American law.6
The terms describing the act necessary to trigger liability as an
accomplice are so broad that they provide no guidance in
determining the defendant's potential liability. One who "aids,"
"abets," "advises," "commands," "counsels," "encourages,"
"induces," "procures," or "hires" can be liable for the particular
crime committed if that person acted with the requisite intent.7 The
mens rea element requires the prosecution to prove that the
defendant intended to assist or encourage the commission of the
crime.' The accomplice's liability does not depend on the degree of
participation in the crime, only that the person provide some
assistance. Mere presence without more is not sufficient to establish
the accomplice's guilt.9
While the accomplice need not physically participate in the
illegal act, nor be present when it takes place, he must have some
relationship to the underlying criminal purpose.0 Therefore, those
who furnish goods or services that facilitate the commission of the
crime but otherwise do not intend to participate in the violation
may escape conviction because they do not have the requisite mens
rea. In United States v. Peoni,n the court stated that accomplice
liability requires that the person in some fashion "associate himself
with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he
6. See, e.g., United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827)
(attributing to the vessel owner the acts of the sailors and captain in determining
criminal liability).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
8. See MuELLER, supra note 3, at 2175 n.28 (stating that an accomplice's
intent must "be directed toward conduct which the accomplice knows to be
criminal," a "proposition so basic that courts generally fail to mention it").
9. See Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 450 (1893) (overturning
conviction of accomplice when jury instruction permitted jury to convict
defendant if it found only that the defendant was present for the purpose of
aiding and abetting the murder, even though he did not in fact provide any
assistance).
10. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 30.01.
11. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
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wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.
All the words used-even the most colorless, 'abet'-carry an
implication of purposive attitude towards it."12 However, a supplier
is not entirely free from criminal liability, because knowledge of
the purchaser's intent to engage in clearly illegal activity can suffice
to hold the seller liable as an accomplice. 3
In addition to imputing liability for those crimes the person
intended to assist, the accomplice may be held liable for any
criminal acts that are a "natural and probable consequence" of the
enterprise. 4 This application of criminal liability does not require
the accomplice to intend that the additional acts take place, only
that they be reasonably foreseeable. 5
Under the common law, the guilt of the principal must be
12. Id. at 402.
13. See Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4h Cir. 1940) ("One who
sells a gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder, would
hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he
received full price for the gun."); see also United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d
1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990). Giovannetti stated:
But [defendant] concedes that the rental of a house for gambling
purposes is the type of assistance that brings the supplier within the
field of the aider and abettor concept, provided the landlord knew what
use his tenant intended to put the rented house to. The reason for this
concession may be that it would be difficult to conceal the purpose of
such a rental from the landlord. If a gambling enterprise to succeed
needs to enlist a landlord who knows the purpose of the rental,
punishing him will make life significantly more difficult for the
enterprise.
Id
14. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at § 30.05B][5] ("[O]nce the prosecutor
proves that a person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime (call it Crime
A), he is also responsible for every other criminal act (e.g., Crimes B and C)
perpetrated by the primary party that was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of Crime A. This doctrine is most often applied in homicide cases." (footnotes
omitted)).
15. See id. ("[T]he effect of the rule is to permit conviction and punishment
of an accomplice whose culpability is less than is required to prove the guilt of
the primary party"); LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 2, § 6.8(b) (criticizing the
"natural and probable consequences" doctrine as "inconsistent with more
fundamental principles of our system of criminal law").
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established in order to hold one liable as an accomplice. If the
principal could not be tried or were found not guilty, then the
accomplice could not be tried or would be acquitted of the crime.16
With the abolition of the common law categories of liability, an
accomplice can be tried and convicted regardless of whether the
principal has been charged or found not guilty. Likewise, a
defendant can be charged with aiding the commission of a crime
even if the principal has not been identified."
In addition to being an accomplice, one may be prosecuted for
soliciting another to commit an illegal act. Prosecution for
solicitation reaches the act before providing the requisite assistance
for accomplice liability by punishing the request to another to
commit a crime. Nevertheless, solicitation statutes generally
employ the same language as that for aiding the commission of a
crime-that one "command," "encourage," or "request" another to
commit an illegal act.'" Since it is a crime that punishes conduct
before the actual commission of the offense, the mens rea element
for solicitation requires proof that the solicitor intended that the
crime occur through the act of another person. What is not always
clear is whether the solicitation must be communicated successfully
16. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, S 30.03[B][5] ("[A]n accessory could not be
convicted of a crime unless and until the principal were convicted.").
17. See LAFAvE & SCoTT, supra note 2, S 6.8(c). It is not clear whether an
accomplice can assert a defense, such as self-defense, that the principal would be
able to assert if the principal were charged with the crime. "One question which
has not been resolved is whether the various defenses available to the principal
in the first degree are likewise available to the accomplice in the sense that the
accomplice may establish the defense and thus show that no crime was
committed by the principal." Id. In United States v. Lopez, the trial court
distinguished between justification and excuse defenses, holding that an
accomplice may use the former as a defense because "[a] third party has the right
to assist an actor in a justified act." United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083,
1086 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 885 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989).
18. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE S 5.02(1) (1962) ("A person is guilty of
solicitation to commit a crime if ... he commands, encourages, or requests
another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime
I * * 11)
1310
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
to the recipient as a prerequisite for a successful prosecution. 9 In
most instances, prosecutors use the statutes for solicitations of
undercover agents, or when the intended recipient cooperates
surreptitiously with the authorities rather than participate in the
proposed criminal plan.
While all jurisdictions recognize the derivative liability of
accomplices, the application of vicarious criminal liability is quite
limited in the United States. Corporate criminal prosecutions are
the principal area in which the liability of the individual actor is
attributed to another party without regard to any separate state of
mind. Corporations are liable for the acts of their agents so long as
the illegal acts come within the scope of employment. 0 Although
corporate criminal liability is not pure vicarious liability because
19. Compare State v. Cotton, 790 P.2d 1050 (N.M. 1990) (interpreting
solicitation statute as imposing communication requirement for commission of
crime), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(2) (1962) ("It is immaterial... that the
actor fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit a crime if his
conduct was designed to effect such communication.").
20. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909), afjfd 212 U.S. 500 (1909). In New York Central, the Supreme
Court applied the civil law principle of respondeat superior liability for the
tortious acts of an entity's employees to determine the corporation's criminal
liability "by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the
corporation for which he is acting in the premises." Id. at 494. Adopting
respondeat superior as a device for proving corporate intent means that "the intent
of the collective entity was necessarily that of each of its constituents." Peter J.
Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Provecutions, 63
TENN. L. REv. 793, 822-23 (1996) (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code
generally limits corporate liability to offenses "authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by
a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of
his office or employment." MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.07(1)(c) (1962). Restricting
corporate criminal liability to acts of its board or managing agents has not been
adopted widely in the United States. In fact, the trend has been to broaden
corporate liability by permitting a conviction even when no individual agent has
the requisite mens rea for the crime but allows the aggregation of the knowledge
of individual employees to determine the corporation's "collective knowledge."
United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
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the intent of the agent is attributed to the corporation as a means to
prove the entity's own mens rea, there is no meaningful distinction
between the two."
Another form of liability that is analogous to vicarious liability
holds supervisors liable for the acts of their employees if they are
the responsible corporate officer. In United States v. Dotterweich,"
the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a pharmaceutical
company's president on the ground that the relevant statute
"dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger."' ' Under the federal environmental statutes, supervisors
have been held liable for violations committed by others in the
corporation, based on circumstantial evidence showing that they
were responsible for its commission.24
Vicarious liability has not been adopted to impose criminal
liability based solely on one's membership in an organization. In
21. See E. M. WISE, Criminal Liability of Corporations-USA, in CRIMiNAL
LIABITY OF CORPORATIONS 383, 388 (H. de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds.,
1996) (XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law) (concluding
corporate criminal liability "is a kind of vicarious liability"). Professor Mueller
has criticized the development of broad corporate criminal liability based on
respondeat superior because "for the most part, the law has proceeded without
rationale whatsoever . . . ." Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the
Corporation, 19 U. PMTr. L. REV. 21, 23 (1957).
22. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
23. Id. at 281. In United States v. Park, the Court held that Dotterweich's
"responsible relation" requirement imposes on the government the duty to
establish a prima facie case that the defendant failed to act and had the authority
to prevent or correct the violation. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-
74 (1975). The Dotterweich and Park prosecutions involved charges under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. % 301-397 (West Supp. 1998),
but the rationale of those cases has been extended to the prosecution of
supervisors for violations of other statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Cattle King
Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 240 (10th Cir. 1986) (prosecuting defendant under the
Federal Meat Inspection Act).
24. See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
1312
INDi. VD UAL LJABILITY
Lanzetta v. New Jersey,' the Supreme Court struck down a state
statute declaring that any person "not engaged in any lawful
occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two
or more persons, who has been convicted... of any crime, in this
or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster" and subject to
conviction resulting in a term of imprisonment up to twenty
years.26 The Court found the language of the provision so broad as
to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the defendant's due
process rights because he did not have sufficient notice of what the
statute prohibited.27
In addition to the constitutional guarantee of due process, the
First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble," 28 which also includes the right to associate
with others. The First Amendment does not furnish any absolute
rights, so in certain limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has
permitted restrictions on free speech and association rights through
criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, a statute making membership
in a criminal organization a separate crime would raise serious
problems regarding a defendant's First Amendment rights. To
overcome constitutional concerns, such a statute would have to be
narrowly drawn and impose on the government the burden of
proving that the person was an "active" member of a group with
the requisite guilty knowledge and intent to perform an illegal act,
or that the defendant's speech sought to "incite" criminal activity. 29
25. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
26. See id at 452.
27. See id. at 458 (f[T]he terms it employs to indicate what it purports to
denounce are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
the government may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961) (holding criminal prosecution
permissible when statute "is found to reach only 'active' members having also a
1998] 1313
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The cases considering the legislature's power to punish activity
that would appear to fall under the protection of the First
Amendment's freedom of association generally involved defendants
participating in political or quasi-political organizations, mainly the
Communist Party0 or fringe political groups. 1 Although purely
criminal organizations are unlikely to raise First Amendment
concerns, the analysis of an individual's liability for being a
member of a criminal enterprise is independent of political
overtones. 2 The general perception of the threat posed by the
Communist Party in the United States in the 1950s is probably no
different than the threat posed by drug cartels operating in the
1990s. Members of each have a right to assemble and express
themselves even though the goals of each may be subject to criminal
prosecution.33
guilty knowledge and intent, and which therefore prevents a conviction on what
otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy with the
alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its
support or any commitment to undertake such action"). For a review of the
development of the Court's analysis of permissible regulation of speech through
criminal prosecutions, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW %g 16.13-.15 (5th ed. 1995).
30. See, eg., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled in part on
other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (prosecuting
Communist Party officials); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(prosecuting distribution of pamphlets criticizing U.S. efforts to overthrow
Bolshevik government); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(prosecuting pacifists who mailed leaflets asserting that the military draft violated
the Thirteenth Amendment and urging draftees not to report).
31. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)
(prosecuting Ku Klux Klan leader for advocating political reform by violence);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (attempting to prohibit march by
members of Illinois Nazi Party through town with significant number of
Holocaust survivors).
32. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388,
1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding freedom of association does not protect enterprise
prosecuted for violating RICO).
33. But see infra text accompanying notes 147-54 (discussing civil injunctions
issued against members of street gangs prohibiting association in public by two
or more gang members).
1314
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Finally, the mere fact of belonging to a particular organization
is unlikely to be made a separate criminal offense in the United
States because there is no strong need for such a law, apart from any
constitutional problems such a statute would likely encounter. The
law of complicity is quite flexible in holding liable those who
provide even minimal assistance in the commission of a crime.
Moreover, as this Report will discuss in the next section, the crime
of conspiracy is very broadly construed, both in its scope and as a
means for holding participants liable for the underlying offenses
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It makes little sense to
use membership in an organization as the basis for a separate
offense when the law already reaches those who are active in the
enterprise.
HI. EXPANDING INDIVIDUAL LiABILiTY: THE SCOPE oF
AMERICAN CONSPIRACY LAW
While one may not be held criminally liable merely for
belonging to a group, if that person agrees to join together with
others to commit a crime, then each member of the group may be
prosecuted for conspiracy. The law of conspiracy-is analytically
quite simple, yet it extends the potential for imposing criminal
liability far beyond that of most other crimes.34 The primary
elements of conspiracy are, first, an agreement among two or more
persons, and, second, that the object of the agreement be to commit
a criminal offense. 5 Most conspiracy statutes, including the federal
34. See Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 1137, 1143 (1973) ("Conspiracy is also a device for expanding the
substantive criminal law and for enhancing punishment.").
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 371 (1994) ("If two or more persons conspire either
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.. . ."). Some
conspiracy statutes permit prosecutions in which the object of the agreement is
to "commit any act injurious to public health, [and] to public morals... ." CAL.
PENAL CODE S 182(5) (West 1988); cf. Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal
Agreement in Theory and Practice, 65 GEO. LJ. 925, 963-64 & n.145 (1977)
1998] 1315
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general conspiracy provision, include a third element that requires
proof that one co-conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy, although that act need not be a crime.36
Conspiracy violations in most jurisdictions generally do not
"merge" with the underlying criminal object; that is, one may be
guilty of conspiracy without regard to whether the proposed illegal
act was ever accomplished or even preliminarily attempted. If the
criminal object is accomplished, then the conspiracy can serve to
aggravate the penalty for commission of a crime in concert with
others.
Conspiracy liability has be criticized because it expands the
crimes for which an individual can be prosecuted beyond those
directly related to the defendant's actions.38 One rationale for
imposing liability for entering a criminal agreement is that group
criminality poses a greater danger to society than the acts of
individuals.39 The result of viewing conspiracy liability as a means
(criticizing conspiracy statutes that permit prosecution for conspiratorial objects
that are not themselves crimes because "[e]ither the act is unlawful or it is not.
If the act itself is legal, conviction for planning to commit the act is an absurd
result.").
36. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957), overruled inpart on
othergrounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding overt act need
not "be the substantive crime charged in the indictment as the object of the
conspiracy").
37. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961) (upholding consecutive
sentences for conspiracy and commission of underlying crime that was object of
conspiratorial agreement); DRESSLER, supra note 1, S 29.03[B][1] ("The non-
merger rule makes sense, however, if one focuses on the alternative rationale of
conspiracy law, i.e., to attack the special threats that conspiratorial groupings
represent."). The Model Penal Code prohibits convictions for both conspiracy
to commit a crime and that underlying offense, unless the conspiracy included
other criminal objects. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(b) (1962).
38. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 1139 ("The law of criminal conspiracy is
not basically sound. It should be abolished, not reformed.").
39. In Callanan, the Supreme Court summarized the "group danger
rationale" supporting a broad interpretation of the conspiracy statute:
Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes
possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one
criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group
1316
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to combat collective criminality is the adoption of broad liability
rules to ensure that individuals are held accountable for the acts of
other participants in the conspiracy.
Conspiracy law has been interpreted expansively in two ways:
first, the definition of what constitutes the agreement can be proved
by circumstantial evidence of both the existence of the agreement
and the intent of the parties to join it; and, second, once an
individual is determined to be a member of a conspiracy, then that
person is liable individually for every criminal act committed by a
co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.
A. Proof of the Conspiratorial Agreement
Because the object of a conspiratorial agreement is illicit,
conspirators are unlikely to leave a clear evidentiary trail of their
agreement. Indeed, conspirators often avoid direct contact with one
another to negate any impression that they are acting in concert. To
mitigate the evidentiary problem of showing the existence of an
agreement, the law of conspiracy does not require proof of a formal
agreement among the members. A mutual understanding among
participants may suffice, even without any explicit confirmation of
the agreement or its criminal object.4° The Supreme Court has
upheld a determination that a conspiracy existed when the
participants never even communicated with one another.41
Prosecutors forced to work with little or no physical evidence
limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked.
Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes
unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed. In
sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the
substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.
Callana?, 364 U.S. at 593-94.
40. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRuMINAL LAW § 12.1 (1997) ("Speaking,
writing, or nodding can signal an agreement, but one also can agree through
silence where, under the circumstances or custom, silence is meant and
understood to mean positive agreement. An agreement is shown whenever there
is a tacit mutual understanding.").
41. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
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of an agreement usually rely on the statements of co-conspirators
regarding the goals or status of the conspiracy to establish its
existence. The predominant means of introducing this type of
evidence is through the testimony of a cooperating witness who
participated in the conspiracy.4' In larger criminal organizations,
the government will seek the cooperation of lower level members
through plea bargains or, if necessary, grants of immunity from
prosecution, in order to gather evidence that will be introduced to
convict the organization's leaders.
Normally, the out-of-court statements of a person are not
admitted as evidence because they are "hearsay," a category of
evidence considered unreliable.43 The rules of evidence employed in
American trial courts, however, recognize an exception to the
exclusion of hearsay evidence for the statements of a co-conspirator.
Due to particular attributes making them reliable, co-conspirator
statements can be introduced as evidence against every member of
the conspiracy, regardless of whether the person against whom they
are used heard the statement or even knew it had been made. For
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides as follows:
"A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he statement is offered against
a party and is... a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'
The salient features of the rule require that the conspirator's
42. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Hon. John Gleeson, The Federalization of
Organized Crime Advantages ofFederal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1095, 1104
(1995) ("Generally speaking, successful prosecution of organized crime leaders
requires the use of accomplice testimony. It is therefore enormously important
to federal prosecutors that a federal defendant can be convicted on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.").
43. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE § 8.2 (1995) ("At the heart of the hearsay doctrine is the conviction
that out-of-court statements are generally an inferior kind of proof. Usually this
conviction can be explained in terms of the various risks that come with relying
on the word or say-so of another person."). There are a number of exceptions to
the general rule prohibiting the introduction of hearsay, based on the
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that the statement is reliable. See
FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note.
44. FED. R. EVID. 801(D) (2) (e).
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statement be (1) during the conspiracy and (2) in furtherance of it.
The question whether one conspirator's statement may be used
against another conspirator frequently revolves around the initial
question regarding the existence of the conspiracy. The problem lies
in the circularity of the analysis: Can the government prove the
conspiracy by having a statement allegedly made in furtherance of
the conspiracy introduced at trial to prove the existence of that
conspiracy?
The Supreme Court provided the answer to this question in
Bourjaily v. United States.45 In Boujaily, the Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence only require that the government prove
the existence of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence
for the trial court to admit the co-conspirator's statement at trial.46
That threshold of proof is much lower than the usual requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which applies to determining
the defendant's guilt but not to preliminary evidentiary questions. 47
Bourjaily went on to answer the next question of whether the
co-conspirator statement itself could be considered in deciding the
evidentiary issue of whether the conspiracy existed to permit that
statement's admission. While seemingly caught in a web of
circularity, or an impermissible "bootstrap" as the defendant
argued, the Court held "there is little doubt that a co-conspirator's
statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a
conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant and the
declarant in the conspiracy." 41 Moreover, the Court did not rule
45. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
46. See id. at 175 ("We have traditionally required that these [evidentiary]
matters be established by a preponderance of proof.... Thus, the evidentiary
standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues...").
47. See id. ("The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting
evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical
issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been
afforded due consideration.").
48. Id. at 180. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that, even if the
co-conspirator's statements met the requirements of the rules of evidence, their
admission violated the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
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out a trial court relying solely on the co-conspirator statement as
proof of the conspiracy's existence for evidentiary purposes. The
Court's decision leaves open the possibility that a defendant could
be convicted of conspiracy based on the statements of others
without direct evidence of his participation in the agreement or an
underlying criminal enterprise. 4
B. The Pinkerton Doctrine of Conspirator Liability
While the question of the threshold of proof required for the
admission of co-conspirator statements seems rather technical, the
issue of conspiracy liability takes on immense importance once the
Pinkerton doctrine comes into the equation. In Pinkerton v. United
States,s' the Supreme Court asserted, without any consideration of
the scope of its pronouncement, that a conspirator is liable for
every substantive crime committed by any other co-conspirator in
the course of the conspiracy.5 Liability for the substantive offense
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Court held that the
admission of co-conspirator statements had been long accepted, and therefore
meeting the requirements of the rules of evidence was sufficient to fulfill the
defendant's constitutional rights. See Bourlaily, 483 U.S. at 183 (holding "there
can be no separate Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of a co-
conspirator's out-of-court statement.").
49. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181 ("We need not decide in this case whether
the courts below could have relied solely upon [the co-conspirator]'s hearsay
statements to determine that a conspiracy had been established by a
preponderance of the evidence."). Under recently proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent of a co-conspirator statement would
have to introduce some independent evidence of the conspiracy's existence before
a court could admit the statement.
50. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
51. The Court asserted that "so long as the partnership in crime continues,
the partners act for each other in carrying it forward." Ia at 646. The Court also
relied on the theory of accomplice liability that "holds responsible one who
counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime" as a basis for
extending liability for the substantive offense to the co-conspirator. See id. at 647.
That analogy ignores the difference between accomplice liability, which requires
proof of intent to commit the crime counseled or encouraged, with conspiracy
liability under Pinkerton, which makes a conspirator liable for a wide variety of
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is in addition to the defendant's liability for the conspiracy, which
is a separate offense. The only limit to Pinkerton liability arises
when the crime "was not in fact done in furtherance of the
conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful object, or
was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not
be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement." 2
The relatively low threshold of proof of the conspiratorial
agreement for evidentiary purposes sanctioned in Bourjaily, coupled
with broad liability for substantive offenses committed as a result
of the agreement, means that the determination of the scope of the
agreement is the crucial issue in a conspiracy prosecution.
Consistent with the law's focus on the special threat of group
criminal activity, courts have been willing to find a broad
agreement among large numbers of defendants who were unaware
of the identity or even the existence of their confederates. The
classic case in this regard is United States v. Bruno,3 in which the
appellate court upheld a single drug distribution conspiracy charge
against eighty-seven defendants, ranging from the importers to the
middlemen who divided up the drugs to retail sellers in two
different cities.' Courts have upheld broad conspiracy charges
crimes that may not have been specifically intended by other participants. See
Johnson, supra note 34, at 1150 ("A far better way to determine the scope of one
individual's liability for the conduct of another would be to abandon conspiracy
altogether, with its notions of businews enteiprises and general partnerships, and
look instead to the policies underlying the specific criminal prohibitions at
issue.").
52. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48.
53. 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'don other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
54. See id. at 922. This type of conspiracy frequently is referred to as a
"chain" conspiracy, because each of the level is linked to the others, and lower
levels depend on the operation of the higher levels. "These conspiracies most
often occur in business-like criminal activities, in which each person or group in
the conspiracy has specialized responsibilities that link together the various
aspects of the unlawful conduct." DRESSLER, supra note 1, S 29.07[][2]. The
other type of conspiracy is called a "wheel" conspiracy, in which one person or
group serves as a hub, and different participants engage in essentially unrelated
criminal activity. The paradigm wheel conspiracy cae is Kotteakos v. United
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when the prosecution demonstrated that the defendant knew the
conspiracy's general scope, regardless of his ignorance of particular
details or the identity of other conspirators."
Under Pinkerton, participation in a wide-ranging conspiracy
opens participants up to liability for the crimes of any member of
the enterprise. By this means, controlling members of criminal
organizations have been held accountable for the acts of their
underlings. In United States v. Aviles,56 the appellate court upheld
the conviction of Mafia leader Vito Genovese for conspiracy to
distribute drugs, observing that:
Although there is no proof that Vito Genovese ever himself
handled narcotics or received any money, it is clear from
what he said and from his presence at meetings of the
conspirators and places where they met and congregated
that he had a real interest and concern in the success of the
conspiracy. We find upon all the evidence that there is
ample proof of Genovese's participation in the conspiracy
as one of its principal directing heads.5 7
The law of conspiracy, however, cannot be used to circumvent
limitations on the scope of prosecutions when the underlying
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), in which the government charged a loan broker and
31 loan recipients with conspiracy related to obtaining fraudulent loans. None
of the 31 borrowers knew of the others, and "no connection was shown between
them... other than that [the loan broker] had been the instrument in each
instance for obtaining the loans." Id. at 754. In that instance, absent some link
between the different "spokes"-a "rim" to the "wheel"-the conspiracies are
separate. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 29.07[C][1].
55. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (stating that
"the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon
showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections to it,
without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation
of others. Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in
proof and of correlating proof with pleading would be insuperable, and
conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity.").
56. 274 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1960).
57. Id. at 188.
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substantive offense would not permit a prosecution of that person.
In Gebardi v. United States,5" the Supreme Court held that a statute
which only sanctioned one participant's conduct in a criminal act
could not be the basis for a conspiracy prosecution of the other
participant who would otherwise be free from any criminal
liability. 9 The rationale of Gebardi has been extended to
prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),10
one of the primary criminal statutes in the United States that
reaches international activities. 1
The FCPA prohibits American corporations from paying
bribes to any foreign official for the purpose of influencing that
official in any way to assist the corporation in obtaining or
retaining business in that country.62 Unlike a more typical bribery
statute, the FCPA only makes the payment illegal, not the receipt.
In United States v. Castle,63 federal prosecutors charged the foreign
recipients of the illicit payments with conspiracy in an effort to
58. 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
59. See id. at 123. The law in question was the Mann Act, which at the time
prohibited transportation of a woman across state lines for the purpose of
engaging in sexual activity. The Court held that the female participant in the
sexual activity could not be convicted of the crime, only the male who engaged
in the interstate transportation, and that the limitation of the statute could not
be avoided by charging the woman with conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. See
iad The Court stated, "it would contravene that policy [cxcmpting womcn from
liability] to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by
the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers." Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994).
61. See Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White
Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325, 329 (1997) (stating the FCPA is the
"most noteworthy" white collar criminal statute directed toward international
activity).
62. See 15 U.S.C. S 78dd-l(a). For a criminal prosecution under the FCPA,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the
payment was intended to influence the foreign official. See id; Bruce Zagaris,
Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 755 (1996) (stating Congress narrowed the intent
standard for criminal violations in 1988 by replacing "reason to know" with
"knowledge").
63. 925 F.2d 831(5th Cir. 1991).
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avoid that limitation on the FCPA." The court of appeals squarely
rejected the government's end-run around the statute, holding that
there was "overwhelming evidence of a Congressional intent to
exempt foreign officials from prosecution for receiving bribes,
especially since Congress knew it had the power to reach foreign
officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power.""
IV. LIMITING THE REACH OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS BY
CURTAILING THEnm USE OF LEGITMATE BUSINESSES TO DISPOSE
OF ILL-GOTTEN GAINS
While the law of conspiracy is broad, it still requires proof that
the defendant intended to join an agreement that he knew would
culminate in a criminal offense. As with any crime that involves
principally a mental element, direct proof of the violation will
often be hard to come by. Moreover, the further removed from the
central criminal act a person is, the harder it will be for prosecutors
to assemble the necessary evidence of criminal intent and active
participation in the conspiracy. The advent of large-scale criminal
organizations makes it especially difficult to reach those at the edge
of the criminal enterprise who facilitate the disposition of ill-gotten
gains but who are not directly culpable for the crime. At the same
time, criminal organizations that generate large amounts of cash
need to dispose of it without arousing suspicion.
Among those hardest to reach under traditional criminal law
doctrines of complicity and conspiracy are ostensibly legitimate
businesses that allow a criminal organization to dispose of the fruits
of its labors. These businesspersons willingly look the other way,
refusing to question either the source of a purchaser's wealth or
highly suspect statements related to the disposition of cash and
other items of value. Without the assistance of fringe players, or the
64. See id
65. Id. at 835. The Fifth Circuit adopted the opinion of the district court in
toto and included it as an appendix to the appellate court's brief statement




possibility of directly controlling otherwise legitimate businesses,
the criminal organization might well realize significantly less of its
ill-gotten gains.
The doctrines of complicity and conspiracy are ill-equipped to
reach these manifestations of a criminal enterprise. Proof of direct
participation in the crime is wanting because those who assist the
organization usually appear after the fact, and their knowledge of
the crime may be lacking because they willingly turn a blind eye.6"
The cleansing of the fruits of illegal activity can be just as important
as the underlying crime, but that process has been considered so
sufficiently distinct from the underlying crime that the United
States has adopted special criminal provisions to address this aspect
of the criminal enterprise's operation.
A. RICO
Perhaps the most famous organized crime provision in the
United States is the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, commonly known as RICO. 7 The statute
targets criminal enterprises that operate both through legitimate
businesses and as illegal associations by creating a crime out of the
commission of a series of other criminal acts.6" RICO requires the
66. The common law recognized a form of accomplice liability for those
who were accessories "after the fact," but liability depended on assisting the
principal in avoiding arrest, trial, or conviction. See DRESSLER, supra note 1,
§ 30.03[A][5]. The disposition of ill-gotten gains appears to be a poor fit with the
traditional common law approach to accomplice liability, and, in any event,
most jurisdictions "treat accessoryship after the fact as an offense separate from,
and less serious than, the felony committed by the principal in the first degree."
Id.
67. 18 U.S.C. 5§ 1961-1968 (1994). Professor Lynch notes that RICO is
among "the most controversial statutes in the federal criminal code. . . ." Gerard
E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime ofBeing a Criminal, Parts I & , 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 661 (1987).
68. The "Statement of Findings and Purpose" adopted by Congress as a
preamble to RICO states:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
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government to prove that the defendant engaged in two or more
acts that constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity," 9 and the
statute defines very broadly the acts that can be used to show the
pattern to include both state law crimes and a long list of federal
crimes.'0 A RICO violation does not, however, require that the
defendant be convicted of the underlying offenses, only that the
government prove that the acts show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity."71
One of Congress' aims in adopting RICO was to attack the
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The state law crimes are "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical
... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year .... Id.
71. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985). RICO also
provides private parties with a civil cause of action for a violation, a rarity in the
federal criminal law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West Supp. 1998). The majority
of RICO decisions, especially those of the Supreme Court, involve interpreting
the scope of the statute in civil cases, not criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Hj. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), affd, 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.
1992); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488. The United States Report on the Special Part will
provide greater detail on the workings of RICO. See Dorean Marquerite Koenig,
The Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organized Crime Section Hk The
Special Part the United States Report, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1351 (1998). The
Supreme Court further illustrated the breadth of RICO in its recent decision in
Salinas v. United States, which concerned a conspiracy to violate RICO. See
Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997). RICO has a separate conspiracy
provision, S 1962(d), but the court held in Salinas that the government need not
prove that the defendant agreed to violate RICO specifically, only that the
agreement encompass criminal acts that would constitute a RICO violation if
carried out. See id at 477. The RICO conspiracy provision is not materially
different from the broader federal conspiracy statute, which raises the question
why § 1962(d) exists if it requires no greater or different proof for a violation
than the more general conspiracy statute.
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perceived infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.
Two types of RICO violations specifically targeted the spread of
organized crime to mainstream businesses. Section 1962(a) of RICO
prohibits "any person who has received any income derived...
from a pattern of racketeering activity" from using those funds to
acquire an interest in or control of another enterprise.72 Section
1962(b) prohibits any person from acquiring or maintaining an
interest in an enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering
activity."73 These two provisions seek to protect legitimate
operations from organized crime by making it illegal to employ a
series of criminal acts or the proceeds of criminal activity to gain
control of a business. This approach to organized crime targets the
"'classic Mafia'-type case" that seeks to expand the power of the
criminal organization through control of ostensibly legitimate
enterprises that can then be used as a cover for continuing criminal
acts. 74
These two approaches to organized crime look beyond the
underlying criminal activity to reach its effect on the regular course
of business. Professor Lynch argues that § 1962(a) "could be
construed as a kind of inchoate crime" because it seeks to punish
those who engage in conduct that would be innocent except for the
source of the funds, not because there is anything inherently
wrongful in the act of investing.75 As the Ninth Circuit noted,
"[Section] 1962(a) prohibits not the engagement in racketeering acts
to conduct an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, but rather
the use or investment of the proceeds of racketeering acts to acquire,
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Congress chose the term "enterprise" because of
its breadth, to include not just businesses but also charitable associations and
labor organizations. See Lynch, supra note 67, at 688 ("Congress' answer was the
'enterprise'-a nicely vague and encompassing term that could cover just about
anything, and was defined so that it did.").
73. 18 U.S.C. S 1962(b) (1994).
74. See Glenn Beard et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,
in Eleventh Survey of White Collar Crime, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 929, 946-47
(1996).
75. See Lynch, supra note 67, at 690-91.
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establish or operate such an enterprise."76
Unfortunately, these two provisions, targeting what Congress
perceived as organized crimes' particularly egregious tactics, in fact
have not proven to be of much use against criminal enterprises.
Section 1962(a) imposes a high burden of proof on the government:
it must show not only the intentional commission of a pattern of
racketeering activity, but further, that the defendant knew that the
funds used to invest in the enterprise were the product of that
pattern. 7 This double intent standard results in few prosecutions
charging a violation of 1962(a). Similarly, S 1962(b) requires proof
of the pattern plus evidence that the defendant sought to gain or
maintain control of an enterprise by the underlying criminal
activity. When the prosecutor proves the predicate pattern, he has
likely demonstrated a violation of S 1962(c), which only requires
proof that the defendant has conducted or participated in the
operation of an enterprise through the pattern of racketeering
activity.'8 "If § 1962(a) seems too cumbersome a tool to be useful to
76. United States v. Robertson, 73 F.3d 249, 251 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. See Lynch, supra note 67, at 691 ("Even if the underlying illegitimate
activities could be proved, it may well be extremely difficult, and it usually will
be burdensome, to prove that the funds used to acquire the interest were indeed
drawn from the profits of the defendant's racketeering activities, rather than
from other sources.")
78. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1962(c) (1994). This provision is the broadest of the
RICO violations, and is the most commonly used basis for both civil and
criminal proceedings because the government only has to show the use of the
enterprise in the pattern of racketeering activity, and need not show the use of
proceeds or the control of the enterprise by the racketeering activity. See BJ.
George, Federal and State Legislation Against Organized Crime in the United States,
in CRIMINAL SCIENCE IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS N HONOR OF GERHARD
O.W. MUELLER, 235, 243 (E. M. Wise ed., 1994) ("The most frequently used
provision of the statute makes it a crime for one who is employed by or
associated with an enterprise . . . to conduct or participate in, directly or
indirectly, the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or loan sharking.") Even S 1962(c) is limited to those who
are responsible for the operation or management of the enterprise, so that not




law enforcement, S 1962(b) appears merely redundant."79
B. Money Laundering
Unlike RICO's attempt to protect legitimate businesses from
organized crime, the Money Laundering Control Act of 19860 has
been much more effective in attacking the supporting infrastructure
of organized crime. One of Congress's goals in adopting the statute
was "to stem the flow of illicit profits back to the criminal
enterprise, where profits provide the capital needed to expand
criminal activity."81 To achieve that goal, Congress expanded the
scope of criminal liability beyond those who participate directly in
the criminal activity to include the ostensibly legitimate merchant
or professional who receives the proceeds of criminal activity in
exchange for goods and services while turning a blind eye to its
source.
Similar in structure to RICO, the money laundering statute
builds upon other crimes as the basis for imposing liability for the
separate offense of money laundering. Under the statute, the
government must prove that the funds are the proceeds of
"specified unlawful activity,"' which is defined by reference to a
long list of federal crimes from which the criminal profits are
derived. Indeed, the money laundering statute includes all of the
acts that can constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" for a
RICO violation as constituting specified unlawful activity. 3 The
second principal element the government must prove is that the
defendant engaged in a "financial transaction," which is broadly
defined to include any transaction that affects interstate or foreign
79. Lynch, supra note 67, at 692.
80. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. % 1956-1957 (West Supp. 1998)).
81. Jimmy Gurul6, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a
New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means
ofPunisbing Specified UnlawfulActivity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 823, 824 (1995).
82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7) (West Supp. 1198).
83. See id.
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commerce, or that involves the use of a financial institution.8'
Section 1956 of the money laundering statute moves beyond the
underlying criminal activity by imposing liability on those who act
with the knowledge that the financial transaction is designed "to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity . ",5 Under this provision, the shopkeeper or
moneychanger who converts the proceeds of criminal acts into
common items of commerce can be held liable for the distinct
offense of money laundering. The government is required to prove
two different elements of knowledge for a S 1956 violation: first,
that the defendant knows the funds are the proceeds of "some form
of unlawful activity," and, second, the defendant's knowledge that
the financial transaction will conceal the source or ownership of the
proceeds.86
While 5 1956 imposes on the prosecution the burden of
showing a dual specific intent, that requirement is not as great as it
may appear. The requisite knowledge of the tainted funds does not
require proof that the defendant knew what specific crime took
place to generate the proceeds, only that they arise from some type
of illegal act that would constitute a felony.87 Second, the intent
84. See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1956(c)(4) (West Supp. 1998). Section 1956(c)(4)
provides:
[T]he term "financial transaction" means (A) a transaction which in any
way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the
movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or
more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any
real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving
the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree ....
Id. The statute also defines "transaction" to include any "purchase, sale, loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition ... " 18 U.S.C.A.
S 1956(c)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
85. 18 U.S.C.A. S 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1998).
86. See id.
87. Section 1956(c)(1) provides:
[T]he term "knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity"
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required for concealment under § 1956 may be shown by the
defendant's "willful blindness" to the circumstances of the financial
transaction, from which a jury may infer the requisite knowledge.88
A violation of the concealment provision of § 1956 does not require
that a person or business engaged in a transaction involving the
receipt of proceeds of illegal acts be motivated by a desire to conceal
or disguise the origin of the funds. It is enough that the criminal
exchanging ill-gotten gains sought to conceal or disguise the
proceeds and that the businessperson knew of that design.9
An excellent example of the application of S 1956 to a
mainstream business is United States v. Wynn,9" in which the co-
owner of a fashionable Washington, D.C. clothing store was found
guilty of money laundering for concealing the source of funds
acquired through sales to two notorious drug dealers. The circuit
court held that only the drug dealers and not the merchant need to
be "motivated by a desire to conceal."91 The defendant store
owner's knowledge of the purchasers' motive arose from his
making false entries in the business' books regarding the identity of
means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction
represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which
form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or
foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified
[unlawful activity) ....
18 U.S.C.A. S 1956(c)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
88. See United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
jury instruction in money laundering prosecution that "defendant's knowledge
of a fact may be inferred by willful blindness to the existence of a fact"). Willful
blindness requires the government to prove that the defendant was on notice of
facts that would lead a person to know or be strongly suspicious of the legality
of an act, and that the person then take steps to avoid acquiring knowledge of the
legality of the act. See United States v. Jeweil, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. See Campbell, 977 F.2d at 857-58 (holding real estate agent liable for
1956 violation in sale of house to drug dealer because "the relevant question is
not Campbell's purpose, but rather her knowledge of [the purchaser's]
purpose.").
90. 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 924. ("Thus, the Government must prove that Edmond and Lewis
were motivated by a desire to conceal or disguise the source or the ownership of
the money they spent at Linea Pitti and that Wynn knew of this design.").
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the purchasers and the evidence that the purchasers "were notorious
drug dealers." That evidence reasonably led the jury to infer that
the defendant "knew that their money was dirty and that he knew
that the two were anxious to disguise their identity as the
purchasers of the merchandise and the source of the cash used to
pay for it."92 Wynn demonstrates that S 1956 can be used against
those who assist organized criminal enterprises even when proof of
the businessperson's direct knowledge of the scheme is
unavailable.9
A second means of reaching normal businesses that assist
criminal organizations in laundering their profits is § 1957, which
punishes any person who knowingly engages in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property with a value greater than
$10,000. 9' As under § 1956, under S 1957 the defendant must know
that the funds are proceeds obtained from a criminal offense,
although one need not know the particular violation, and that
specified unlawful activity in fact generated the property.9"
However, a S 1957 violation only requires proof of the defendant's
knowledge of the relation of the proceeds to the underlying
criminal activity, without regard to whether the criminal using the
92. Id. at 925.
93. See also United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 893 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "there is no evidence of an express statement to [defendant] that the
cash to be used in purchasing the Porsche was the proceeds of marijuana sales.
To the contrary, [an informant] and the agents testified that they never
specifically told [defendant] that they money came from drug proceeds. There
were, however, statements of various facts from which a reasonable person
would almost certainly infer that drug proceeds were involved."); Campbell, 977
F.2d at 858 (stating that "the fraudulent nature of the transaction itself provides
a sufficient basis from which a jury could infer [defendant]'s knowledge of the
transaction's purpose if, as assumed above, [defendant] also know of the illegal
source of [the] money.").
94. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1998); H.R. REP. No. 99-855, at
14 (1986) ("It is time for us to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, '[i]f you
know that person is a trafficker and has this income derived from the offense,
you better beware of dealing with that person.'") (statement of Rep. Lungren).
95. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(t)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1998).
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proceeds sought to conceal or disguise the source of the funds.96
There are two important differences between S 1956 and 1957.
First, S 1957 prosecutions require that the particular transaction
involve property with a value greater than $10,000, which is not an
element under S 1956. Second, S 1957 applies to any "monetary
transaction" while S 1956 uses the term "financial transaction." The
definition of a "monetary transaction" requires the use of a financial
institution, while a "financial transaction" can involve two private
individuals, neither of whom may qualify as a "financial
institution."97 Prosecutors have not used S 1957 against merchants
to the same extent as § 1956, even though the former provision does
not require proof of the additional element of the merchant's
knowledge of concealment."
Sections 1956 and 1957 cover a broad array-of transactions by
ostensibly legitimate businesses that assist organized criminal
enterprises in processing the fruits of their illegal activity. The
money laundering statute makes trafficking in the proceeds of
crime much riskier because the elements of a money laundering
prosecution do not require knowledge of the specifics of the
underlying criminal activity. Organized crime depends on outsiders
96. See Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859 (upholding § 1957 conviction of real estate
agent who assisted drug dealer in purchase of house, noting that "the dispositive
question is whether Campbell knew that [Lhe drug dealer]'s funds weie the
proceeds of criminal activity").
97. 18 U.S.C.A. S 1957(0(1) (West Supp. 1998). The definition of a "financial
institution" is based on 31 U.S.C. S 5312(a)(2), which includes not only banks
but also securities deals, pawnbrokers, travel agencies, businesses engaged in
vehicle sales, persons involved in real estate closings, casinos, and "any other
business designated by the Secretary [of the Treasury] whose cash transactions
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters." 31
U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1994). Although the list is quite broad, many common
commercial transactions do not involve financial institutions.
98. See Emily J. Lawrence, Note, Let the Seller Beware: Money Laundering,
Merchants, and 18 U.S.C % 1956, 1957,33 B.C. L. REV. 841, 866 (1992) (holding
5 1957 is rarely used to prosecute merchants for money laundering). The author
argues that "[p]erhaps the single greatest factor preventing increased use of S 1957
against merchants is the fear that public perception will be negative, thereby
endangering support for all attempts to combat money laundering." Id. at 872.
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willing to provide some measure of assistance so long as they can
maintain the patina of legitimacy by not knowing the particulars of
the criminal enterprise's operation. The government can now reach
those businesses that serve as auxiliaries to organized crime through
the money laundering statute because any effort to hide the
transaction or a businessperson's willingness to turn a blind eye has
been transformed into proof of the defendant's intent to commit
the crime of money laundering.
V. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS
A. Sentences for Criminal Organizations and Participants
The federal government initiates the majority of prosecutions
of large-scale criminal organizations and upon conviction the
defendants are subject to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Sentencing Commission adopted the Guidelines as a detailed set of
rules that are designed to provide uniformity and proportionality
in sentencing by limiting the judiciary's discretion in setting the
term of imprisonment or other sanctions.99
The Sentencing Commission adopted the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations in 1991 to create a system under
which corporations and other organizations would be encouraged
to put in place and enforce effective compliance programs to detect
wrongdoing within the organization." The Organization
Guidelines provide for three types of sanctions: restitution,
probation, and fines.01 If the organization "operates primarily for
99. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 1, Pt. A (1993)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission to administer the Guidelines, and empowered the Commission to
"prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appropriate sentence for each class of
convicted persons determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories
with the offender characteristic categories." Id; see also Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
3551-3559 (1994)).
100. See U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, intro. comment.
101. See id.
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a criminal purpose" or by criminal means, then the fine imposed
upon conviction must be "sufficient to divest the organization of all
its net assets."" 2 This sanction for criminal organizations has been
referred to as a "corporate death penalty."103
For legitimate organizations, the fines prescribed by the
Organization Guidelines can be aggravated or, more importantly,
mitigated significantly depending upon the degree of cooperation
in the investigation and the presence of an effective compliance
program that shows the organization exercises "due diligence in
seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct."0 4 The court may
also sentence a corporation to a term of probation, and the
Guidelines recommend imposition of several conditions on the
entity, including publication of the offense and conviction, periodic
reports on financial condition, and surprise audits.05
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for prison sentences for
individuals violating RICO and the money laundering statute. The
underlying offenses introduced to prove the "pattern of
racketeering activity"can be used under the Sentencing Guidelines
to increase the penalty if those crimes would result in a higher
sentence than the punishment for RICO. 6 The Sentencing
Guidelines mandate an increased term of imprisonment for a
money laundering violation if the defendant had knowledge or
belief that the funds were proceeds of "specified unlawful activity"
102. Id. § 8C1.1.
103. Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without... : Some Critical Reflections on the
Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397, 434 (1993).
104. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k). The Organization Guidelines provide a
multiplier, based on the degree of cooperation and the presence or absence of
compliance program, that can increase or decrease the fine for a violation. See id.
55 8C2.5()-(g) (providing for reductions in an organization's "culpability score"
used to determine the amount of the fine based on self-reporting of a violation,
acceptance of responsibility, and adoption of an effective compliance program).
105. See id. § 8D1.4.
106. See U.S.S.G. 9 2E1.1(a) (stating the base offense level for RICO is the
greater of (1) nineteen or (2) "the offense level applicable to the underlying
racketeering activity").
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involving narcotics. 7
Apart from the Sentencing Guidelines, Congress requires courts
to impose mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes,
requiring the defendant to serve a specified term of imprisonment
upon conviction. For criminal organizations involved in drug
trafficking, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) provision
prescribes a twenty year mandatory sentence for those defendants
who import or sell drugs "in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of
management."'0 8 If an intentional killing occurs during the course
of the CCE violation, then the death penalty can be imposed. 9
B. The Growing Use of Asset Forfeiture as a Weapon to Attack
Organized Crime
The lifeblood of any enterprise is the ability to expand its
revenues by reinvesting profits to grow the business. Both
legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate on the same basic
principles, albeit with divergent means and, perhaps, ends.
Attacking the economic foundations of the criminal enterprise
through the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime and
instrumentalities employed by the organization has become
increasingly important as a less burdensome approach to
undermining large-scale illegal operations. 0 As a side-benefit, asset
forfeitures generate funds for further law enforcement activities."'
Professor Fried notes that the burgeoning use of asset forfeiture "is,
107. SeeU.S.S.G. S 2S1.1(b)(1) (6 1956 violations); U.S.S.G. 5 2S1.2(b)(1)(A)
( 1957 violations).
108. 21 U.S.C. S 848 (c)(2)(A) (1994).
109. See 21 U.S.C. S 848(e)(1) (1994).
110. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court
Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 60-61 (1993)
(stating that "asset forfeiture has become one of the primary weapons employed
to supplement criminal prosecutions").
111. See 28 U.S.C. S 524(c) (1994) (authorizing Assets Forfeiture Fund to
make funds from seizures available for criminal law enforcement activities).
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in effect, the first new punishment for crime since the rise of the
penitentiary in the early nineteenth century."1 2
Asset forfeiture actions can be brought for narcotics
convictions, including CCE violations, RICO, and money
laundering."' In a criminal proceeding, the government includes a
list of all property derived from or traceable to the offense as a
count in its indictment, and upon conviction the forfeiture is
automatic.1 14 In order to increase the effectiveness of this law
enforcement tool, Congress adopted a number of changes in the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA) that permit the
government to reach assets earlier in the proceeding and that
expand the scope of the forfeiture provisions.1 ' These changes have
provoked substantial criticism of the government's use of forfeiture
112. David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRwNOLOGY 328, 330 (1988); see Erik S. Schimmelbusch, Comment, Pretrial
Restraint of Substitute Assets Under RICO and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and ControlAct of 1970, 26 PAC. Lj. 165, 175 (1995) ("The drastic
remedy of mandatory forfeiture as a punishment for crime is a relatively new
practice in the United States.").
113. See 18 U.S.C. S 982 (1994) (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. 9 1963(a)
(1994) (RICO); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994) (drugs). The different statutes authorize
the forfeiture of different types of property. RICO forfeiture permits the
government to seize a defendant's interest in the enterprise "which the person
has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct
of, in violation of" RICO, and any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from
the pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. S 1963(a)(2)-(3). Forfeiture for
a money laundering violation can reach "any property, real or personal, involved
in such offense, or any property traceable to such property." 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1). Drug violations authorize forfeiture of the broadest array of
property, covering conveyances used to transport the contraband, money that
constitutes either proceeds of drug sales or funds intended to be used to make a
purchase, and real property used in any way to commit the violation, including
any improvements on the property, such as a home or business. See 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(1)-(11) (1994).
114. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1963(a) (3) (1994) ("The court, in imposing sentence on
such person shall order ... that the person forfeit to the United States all
described in this subsection.") (emphasis added).
115. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, S 302,
98 Star. 2040 (1984).
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as an additional weapon in attacking criminal organizations." 6
A key change made by the CFA was the adoption of the
"relation back" provision, which provides that "[a]ll right, title, and
interest in [forfeitable] property vests in the United States upon the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section."1
The relation back doctrine means that the government owns the
property from the instant the crime occurs, so that the criminal
cannot transfer it to anyone else except a "bonafide purchaser for
value.., who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause
to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.""3
To enhance the effectiveness of forfeitures, the CFA authorized
the government to seek an order before trial freezing property that
would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction to prevent its
dissipation or transfer beyond the court's jurisdiction. The
government must show a "substantial probability" it will prevail at
trial, that the order will prevent the destruction or removal of the
property, and that the restraint outweighs "the hardship to any
party against whom the order is to be entered.""' The government
can even seek an exparte temporary restraining order before it files
116. See Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on
Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 275 (1992); Michael Paul Austem Cohen,
Note, The Constitutional Infirmity ofRICO Forfeiture, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
937 (1989); Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine:A
More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165
(1990); Tamara R. Piety, Note, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911
(1991); Damon Garett Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in
the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights,
72 B.U. L. REv. 217 (1992).
117. 18 U.S.C. S 1963(c) (1994).
118. Id (emphasis added). After conviction, a person, other than the
defendant, who claims a legal interest in the forfeited property can file a petition
"to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963Q)(2) (1994). The burden of proof is on the claimant to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the purchase was bonafide and there was no
cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C.
19631)(6) (B) (1994).119. 18 U.S.C. § i963(d)(l)(B) (1994).
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its charges if it can demonstrate that providing notice to the
property holder would "jeopardize the availability of the property
for forfeiture."'20
The government has used the relation back doctrine to seize
funds that the defendant used to pay his attorney to defend him in
the prosecution. In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the relation back
doctrine even when forfeiture deprives a defendant of his right to
retain the counsel of his choice.'2 In a companion case decided the
same day, United States v. Monsanto," the Court held that the
forfeiture statute does not provide a sub silentio exemption for
attorneys fees from the property subject to a forfeiture order. 24
Another important change the CFA implemented permits the
government to forfeit substitute assets of the defendant if the
property derived from the crime cannot be traced because of the
defendant's acts or omissions. The government must show that it
cannot locate the property because the asset: "(1) cannot be located
upon the exercise of due diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold
to, or deposited with, a third party; (3) has been placed beyond the
jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been substantially diminished in
value; or (5) has been commingled with other property which
cannot be divided without difficulty ... ." ' When considered in
connection with the authority to seek a pre-trial restraint of assets,
this provision creates the possibility that the government can scek
to bar the transfer of substitute assets that are not related to the
underlying criminal activity. The courts are split on whether the
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1994).
121. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
122. See id. at 635. The government had indicted the defendant for a CCE
violation, and the trial court entered a pre-trial restraining order barring any
transfer of funds by the defendant. The defendant then sought to transfer $25,000
to his attorney after pleading guilty and agreeing to the forfeiture. The law firm
sought to recover the funds the defendant wanted to use to pay the fee. See id. at
619-21.
123. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
124. See id. at 614.125. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(m) (1994).
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statute authorizes freezing assets that the government could not
otherwise touch until after a criminal conviction, although the
trend has been to reject prosecutorial requests for the pre-trial
restraint of substitute assets. 126
In In re Billman, the fugitive defendant transferred proceeds
from a massive fraudulent scheme to Swiss banks that were beyond
the jurisdiction of the United States courts. 2 The appellate court
interpreted the pre-trial restraint provision of RICO to permit the
freezing of substitute assets because the law "do[es] not permit a
defendant to thwart the operation of forfeiture laws by absconding
with RICO proceeds and then transferring his substitute assets to
a third person who does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for
value."128 In United States v. Ripinsky, on the other hand, a different
appellate court rejected the government's attempt to freeze $1.7
million of the defendant's funds held in England.'29 The court noted
126. Compare In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding pretrial
restraint of substitute assets permitted); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding pretrial restraint of substitute assets permissible if restraint
of fruits of illegal activity would burden third parties); United States v. Schmitz,
153 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding pretrial restraint of substitute assets
permitted); United States v. Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding
pretrial restraint of substitute assets permitted), and United States v. Skiles, 715
F. Supp. 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding pretrial restraint of substitute assets
permitted), with United States v. Field, 62 F.3d 246 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
pretrial restraint of substitute assets); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359 (9th
Cir. 1994) (rejecting pretrial restraint of substitute assets); In re Assets of Martin,
1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting pretrial restraint of substitute assets), and
United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting pretrial restraint
of substitute assets). See James M. Rosenthal, Note, Should Courts Impose RICO's
Pretrial Restraint Measures on Substitute Assets, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1139, 1143
(1995) (arguing pretrial restraint of substitute assets should not be permitted
under the forfeiture provisions).
127. Billman, 915 F.2d at 917.
128. Id at 921.
129. See Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363. The provisions at issue were 21 U.S.C.
852(e), which authorizes the pretrial restraint of "property described in
subsection (a) of this section," and § 852(a)(1), which only refers to "property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or
indirectly, as the result of such -violation." 21 U.S.C. 5 852(a)(1), (e) (1994).
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that the language of the statute only refers to property traceable to
the offense, and refused to interpret the provision more broadly
because to do so would "read the statute in a manner so clearly
contradictory to the plain statutory language."13 The Ripinsky
court also reflected more generally on the propriety of the
government's attempt to expand further its already broad forfeiture
power in the pre-trial context:
In conclusion, we note that criminal forfeiture laws
provide the government with extensive powers to seize the
assets of criminals. In asking us to authorize the pretrial
restraint of substitute assets, the government asks us to
grant them an even more powerful weapon, a weapon
available against the accused, indeed, the presumed
innocent. The government argues that such restraints only
maintain the status quo until the trial is over, but these
restraints can have far-reaching effects. They allow the
government to reach virtually all of an individual's or a
business's assets. Such restraints can cripple a business and
destroy an individual's livelihood. In the face of clear
statutory language to the contrary, we refuse to extend this
drastic remedy to the untainted assets of an individual who
is merely accused of a crime, and thus is presumptively
innocent."
In addition to asset forfeitures that are part of criminal
prosecutions, the law also permits the government to seize assets
through civil proceedings. Civil forfeitures have significant
procedural advantages for the government, primarily a significantly
lower burden of proof and no requirement that the owner of the
property receive notice of the seizure. Under the procedural rules
governing civil forfeitures, the government need only identify the
property seized and its connection to the underlying violation for
130. SeeRipinsky, 20 F.3d at 363.
131. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365.
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the court to order a seizure. The fiction is that the property is
guilty of the violation, and therefore the action is only in rem, that
is, against the inanimate object and not against the individual
owner, so the greater protections of a criminal proceeding need not
be applied. 32
Except for seizures of real property,'33 the government need not
inform the owner that it intends to forfeit the property, and the
owner cannot object until after the government seizes it.134 For a
civil forfeiture, the government only has to demonstrate that there
is probable cause that the items are traceable to the applicable
criminal act. 3 ' Once seized, the burden is on the claimant of the
property to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the items
are not traceable to a violation. Together with the lower burden of
proof, the government can use the asset forfeiture laws to take
control of assets before they can be dissipated or transferred out of
the country, and then wait to see if anyone makes a claim for the
property.
While the civil avenue provides the government with significant
132. See Stahl, supra note 116, at 294 ("Actions against property have been
labeled civil. In these cases, courts operate under the assumption that the issue
is the guilt or innocence of the property itself."). The use of in rem proceedings
to seize assets has a long history in the maritime arena, in which vessels would
be seized to satisfy debts arising from a commercial dispute or because the ships
were used for illegal purposes, such as smuggling to avoid customs duties. See id.
at 295.
133. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993) (holding
government must provide pre-seizure notice to real property owners).
134. See Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1094 (7th Cir. 1986) "("pre-
seizure hearings are not constitutionally required, so long as interested persons
are given notice and an opportunity for a post-seizure hearing.").
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (d) (1994). Subsection (b) provides that the
forfeiture proceedings be governed by the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and subsection (d) adopts the customs laws as
applicable to determining the rights of the parties. Under 19 U.S.C. S 1615
(1994), which covers asset forfeitures for customs violations, any proceeding for
"the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise or baggage seized..
the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant .... Provided, that probable
cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action .... " 19
U.S.C. S 1615 (1994).
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procedural advantages, the principal limitation on this method of
seizing assets is that only those items derived from or traceable to
the violation can be seized. Unlike criminal proceedings, a civil
proceeding cannot be used to reach substitute assets. Thus the
government must link the items it wishes to seize with the
violation they allege generated the property, a task that may be
quite arduous if the miscreants have hidden the money well.
Claimants have challenged the use of civil proceedings to seize
assets on constitutional grounds, but two recent Supreme Court
decisions emphatically rejected arguments to limit the government's
power in this area. In Bennis v. Michigan,"6 the Court dismissed a
due process argument that innocent owners have the constitutional
right to a hearing to contest the seizure of property. 37 The Court
stated that "a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which
the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was
to be put to such use." 3 ' In United States v. Ursery,"9 the defendant
argued that the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy,
which prevents the government from putting a defendant "twice in
jeopardy" for the same offense,'O meant that the government could
not pursue a civil forfeiture after it had convicted the defendant for
the underlying criminal violation because the forfeiture amounted
to a second punishment for the same crime.14' The Court again
136. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
137. See id. at 450-52. The property at issue was an automobile jointly owned
by a husband and wife that the government seized as a public nuisance because
the husband had used the vehicle to engage the services of a prostitute. See id. at
442-44. The wife argued that she should have an opportunity to contest the
seizure by presenting an innocent owner defense, which the Michigan statute did
not recognize as a basis for challenging a seizure: "[S]he claims she was entitled
to contest the [seizure] by showing she did not know her husband would use it
to violate Michigan's indecency law." Id. at 44648.
138. Id. at 446-48.
139. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
140. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
141. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 271-73. Ursery involved two cases consolidated
for decision before the Court. In the first case, the defendant settled a forfeiture
claim by paying money to the government, and was then indicted for the
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made a clear finding in favor of the government, holding that "in
rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and
does not constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause." 42 In Hudson v. United States, 3 the Court held that civil
remedies that have a punitive aspect, such as forfeiture, do not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause even if the government brings
a criminal prosecution involving the same underlying conduct."4
In light of Ursery and Hudson, the government has unfettered
discretion to choose to proceed civilly to seize property while also
pursuing a parallel criminal prosecution of the individual for the
same criminal act. The only procedural limitations are the rather
minimal requirements of the federal asset forfeiture law that permit
seizures based on probable cause and place the burden on the
individual contesting a seizure to prove a superior claim to the
government's relation back interest.'45 Bennis leaves to the
violation that was the basis of the forfeiture action. In the second case, the
defendants were convicted of various drug violations, and then the government
received a judgment in a civil in rem proceeding ordering the forfeiture of the
proceeds and instrumentalities of the defendant's crimes. See id at 268-73. For the
purposes of arguing a Double Jeopardy Clause violation, the order of the
proceedings was irrelevant, and the issue was whether the civil action constituted
a punishment for invoking the constitutional protection.
142. Id. at 277-79.
143. 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
144. See id at 495. The Court overturned its earlier decision in United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), which applied double jeopardy to prohibit
multiple civil and criminal proceedings if the civil action sought any nonremedial
sanctions. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. The Hudson Court noted that "some
of the ills at which Halper was directed are addressed by other constitutional
provisions," such as due process, equal protection, and the prohibition on
excessive fines. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495.
145. The only effective constitutional limit on the government's forfeiture
authority is the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993), and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602 (1993), the Supreme Court held that civil and criminal forfeitures may
constitute excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment, although
neither opinion set forth a test to determine what constitutes excessiveness. The
Court will consider what constitutes an excessi-e Fine in its next term when it
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legislature the decision whether to grant an innocent owner the
opportunity to contest the seizure because there is no constitutional
requirement that third party rights in the property be recognized
as superior to the government's claim that its title vested upon
completion of the criminal act. The government's power to reach
property under the asset forfeiture provisions is quite broad and an
attractive adjunct to the direct prosecution of members of criminal
organizations. The question is, of course, whether prosecutors will
abuse their authority and, quite possibly, cause a reaction that leads
legislators to rein in the government's power to seize property
constituting the fruits and instrumentalities of crime."'
C. Injunctive Relief to Stop Street Gangs: The Next Wave?
A feature of organized crime that is of mounting concern is the
threat street gangs pose, which differs from the threats more
traditional criminal enterprises pose, such as the Mafia, in their
comparative youth but not in any lack of violence or enforcement
of discipline. Apart from geographic proximity, the organizational
profile of most street gangs is based on race or ethnicity. These
gangs have been known to control and terrorize large territories
containing significant populations of lower-income residents. As
the media paid greater attention to street gangs, some have become
widely known, such as the Crips and Bloods that trace their origin
to Los Angeles and are now nationally infamous.14
reviews United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996), affid, 118 S. Ct.
2028 (1998). In this case, the appellate court held that the forfeiture of all funds
that the defendant failed to declare when leaving the United States was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Unlike the state statute at issue
in Bennis, the federal asset forfeiture laws provide an innocent owner defense. See
21 U.S.C. S 853(n) (1994).
146. See, e.g., Linnet Myers, Forfeiture Laws: Fair or Foul?, CH. TRIB., Mar.
12, 1996, at 6 (discussing a bill introduced in Congress to amend the federal
forfeiture provisions to shift burden of proof from claimant to taxpayer, and
description of forfeiture laws by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Hyde
as "Kafkaesque").
147. See David R, Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead- State Statutory
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Attention has focused on how to control street gangs, which are
often loose conglomerations of members rather than the tightly-
knit organizations seen in more hierarchical criminal enterprises.
In California, local governments are trying a new approach, seeking
broad injunctions against gang members to prohibit them from
associating together publicly and to prevent them from harassing or
intimidating residents of the neighborhood where the gang
operates. The legal basis for the injunction is that the gangs
constitute a "public nuisance" and that governments traditionally
have the authority to abate a nuisance that is injurious to the
general public. 4
In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna,49 the California Supreme Court
upheld the validity of two provisions of an injunction against gang
members that restricted the members' right to associate in public
and that restrained them from interfering with residents of the
neighborhood where the gang congregated.'-' The court rejected the
argument that the restriction on gang members to publicly
associate, which prohibited two or more members from
"[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing
anywhere in public view," violated the First Amendment on the
ground that "[f]reedom of association . . . 'does not extend to
joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of
their lawful rights.'"'5 ' The court also rejected a challenge to the
restriction on their dealings with residents, holding that the
Responses to Ciminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 694-95 (1995)
(reviewing development of Crips and Bloods and their expansion beyond
California in the 1980s).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 821B(2)(a) (1979) (listing
public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience as rights whose
unreasonable interference with can constitute a public nuisance).
149. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), cert. deniedsub nom. Gonzalez v. Gallo, 117
S. Ct. 2513 (1997).
150. See id. at 608. The injunction covered a four-square-block area in San
Jose, California, and applied to thirty-eight members of the VST gang. See id. at
602.




language of the injunction was sufficiently clear that it was not void
due to its vagueness.5 2
The California Supreme Court described vividly the conditions
facing residents from the occupation of their neighborhood by the
street gang:
Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on
lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at
all hours of the day and night. They display a casual
contempt for notions of law, order, and decency-openly
drinking, smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting
cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents' cars.
The people who live in Rocksprings are subjected to loud
talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, brutality, fistfights
and the sound of gunfire echoing in the streets. Gang
members take over sidewalks, driveways, carports,
apartment parking areas, and impede traffic on the public
thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar.
Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and
battery, vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace. The
community has become a staging area for gang-related
violence and a dumping ground for the weapons and
instrumentalities of crime once the deed is done. Area
residents have had their garages used as urinals; their homes
commandeered as escape routes; their walls, fences, garage
doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a
sullen canvas of gang graffiti.
152. See id. at 613-14. The Supreme Court has held that statutes which are
not reasonably specific in their language violate the defendant's right to due
process because they do not give adequate notice of what the law requires. See
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.") The
language of the injunction at issue enjoined the defendants from "confronting,
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting
and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visitors" to the area. SeeAcuna, 929
P.2d at 613.
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The people of this community are prisoners in their
own homes. Violence and the threat of violence are
constant. Residents remain indoors, especially at night.
They do not allow their children to play outside. Strangers
wearing the wrong color clothing are at risk. Relatives and
friends refuse to visit. The laundry rooms, the trash
dumpsters, the residents' vehicles, and their parking spaces
are used to deal and stash drugs. Verbal harassment, physical
intimidation, threats of retaliation, and retaliation are the
likely fate of anyone who complains of the gang's illegal
activities or tells the police where drags may be hidden."'
Given the difficulties local authorities face in trying to protect law-
abiding citizens from gang violence, injunctions are a less
cumbersome method of attempting 'to rid a neighborhood of gangs
without putting the innocent residents in danger of retaliation for
testifying if the government pursues direct prosecutions of the gang
members.
Since Acuna, more jurisdictions in California have sought
injunctions to restrict the activities of street gangs.1 4 The key
question is whether these types of injunctions will survive a federal
constitutional challenge. There is a substantial question whether a
restriction on the rights of gang members to congregate in public
will survive a challenge as a violation of their First Amendment
rights. The problem this type of organized crime poses is that it
affects an entire geographic area and makes the lives of those
affected almost unbearable. The injunctions are a creative approach
to street gangs that will certainly be copied if the Supreme Court
153. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601-02.
154. See, e.g., Rich Connell & Robert J. Lopez, Judge Leans Toward Ban of
Gatherings by 18th Street Gang, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at A3 (reporting Los
Angeles sought an injunction against eighteen members of street gang that would
prohibit two or more from congregating in public even if they were on private
property); Arleen Jacobius, Court Approves Gang Injunctions, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1997, at 34 (reporting that in the past three years, approximately twelve anti-gang
injunctions have been granted in ten California cities).
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were to find that they pass constitutional muster.
VI. CONCLUSION
The liability of individuals for group conduct raises a number
of substantial questions in the United States. The basic tools of the
criminal law accomplice and conspiracy liability, are broad and
frequently serve the purpose of holding one member of a criminal
enterprise responsible for the acts of confederates. A more recent
development has been the adoption of RICO and the money
laundering statute to make peripheral participation in group
criminality a separate offense. Prosecutions for money laundering
against those who assist criminals in disposing of the proceeds of
their illegal activities can be an effective means to reach a broader
array of defendants who operate outside the direct criminal
activities of the organization. An especially important aspect is the
use of "willful blindness" as a method for proving the requisite
intent.
The burgeoning use of asset forfeitures to combat criminal
organizations is a prominent feature of the law of the United States.
Through the use of civil forfeiture actions, the fruits of the illegal
enterprise and its instrumentalities can be seized quickly and
without notice to prevent dissipation or transfer of the assets. The
question is whether the interests of third parties will receive
sufficient protection. The Supreme Court's decisions in Bennis,
Ursery and Hudson effectively hold that there is no significant
constitutional limit on the government's power to pursue civil asset
forfeiture proceedings. Instead, complete discretion rests with the
legislature to decide the degree of protection to afford innocent
persons affected by asset forfeitures, and with prosecutors to decide
whether and how to seek the forfeiture of property. The drive to
fight organized crime could be set back, however, if prosecutors
violate the public's perception of fairness by misusing the broad
authority to confiscate the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.
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